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ABSTRACT 
The notion of quality constitutes the title of a pressing philosophical problem. 
The issue of the location of the qualities of experience and reality leads to 
thematize the “clash” between the scientific and the manifest image, which also 
lays at the heart of the issues of naturalism and reductionism in the philosophy 
of mind. I argue that a transcendental version of the enactive approach 
constitutes a fruitful way to address these issues, thanks to its conception of the 
relation between subject and object as dependent co-origination. In this way, the 
enactive view constitutes an alternative to both the internalism and the 
externalism about qualities (which lead, respectively, to scientific and to naïve 
naturalism), constituting a processual and relationist framework that can be 
fruitfully applied to the analysis of different ontological domains. In the 
conclusive section, I distinguish between an ontological and a metaphysical 
interpretation of this view, stressing the advantages of the former. 
1. The Problem of the Qualities 
The guiding thread of this Special Issue is the observation that the notion of 
quality constitutes the title of a fundamental and pressing problem for 
contemporary philosophy. Why is it so? To introduce this problem, let me refer 
to the literary description of an ordinary, but powerful, experience that we can 
find in a famous passage from Proust’s In Search of Lost Time. At the very 
beginning of this masterwork, the  narrator tells about a winter day, in which he 
is “weary” after “a dull day” with “the prospect of a depressing morrow”. At his 
return at home, seeing that he is cold, his mother offers him a cup of warm tea, 
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accompanied by one of those little cakes called “petites madeleines”. The 
narrator then tells that suddenly, after tasting a spoonful of the warm tea in which 
he had soaked a morsel of the cake, “a shudder” runs through his whole body, 
and “an exquisite pleasure” invades his senses. His previous mood, then, 
radically changes, being substituted by a state of happiness “in whose presence 
other states of consciousness melted and vanished”. The passage continues with 
the efforts put by the narrator on understanding the reasons for this intense 
experience, when suddenly the memory of the events of the past to which that 
experience was linked re-emerge to his mind1. 
I refer to this passage because it expresses how our ordinary experience, and 
the language through which we communicate it, is totally pervaded with 
qualities, which pertain to it at various levels and that can be referred, at the same 
time and for the most part ambiguously, to subjective experience and the 
experienced reality. The objects of perception (the tea, the cake) are 
characterized by colors, smells, tastes, etc. At the same time, these qualities are 
perceived through subjective sensations that continuously change in relation to 
internal and external conditions, and this is testified by the fact that the same 
ordinary expressions such as “yellow”, “warm”, etc. refer to both subjective 
sensations and to objectual properties. Furthermore, the whole experience is 
pervaded by various qualities that range from bodily sensations (the “shudder” 
in the previous passage, but we can think of sensations of pleasure, pain, and 
tickles, itches, etc.) to feelings, emotions and moods2. 
What philosophical account of these different qualities of experience and/or 
reality can be given? To raise the problem of the quality means to raise the 
general and original problem of the relation between appearance and reality, 
which is a classic and fundamental issue of philosophy since ever. In particular, 
since the very beginning of the philosophical enterprise, the reflection on the 
relation between subjective experience and its objects gives rise to difficult 
problems. Starting from the analysis of ordinary perception, the inquiry into its 
nature draws immediately the attention to phenomena such as the 
(intrapersonal) perceptual relativity: I believe that the lemon in front of me is 
yellow, that it has an oval shape, etc. but simply moving around it and 
 
1 The quotations are from Remembrance of Things Past, transl. by C. K. Scott Moncrieff, Terence 
Kilmartin, and Andreas Mayor (Vol. 7). New York: Random House, 1981 (3 vols). 
2 The brief characterization here outlined of the qualities of experience and reality does not want to be 
exhaustive and rigorous, but I am using it just as a sketch for introducing the problem of the qualities. 
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prosecuting the perceptual experience I realize that its perceptual appearance 
(its color, shape, smell, etc.) continuously changes in relation to different 
sources of variation (the ambient light, my position in space, the state of 
adaptation of my senses - such as the adaptation to the light of my eyes - etc.)3. 
Furthermore, the reflection on perceptual experience soon leads to highlight 
the possibility of phenomena such as illusions and hallucinations. All these 
phenomena constitute the so-called “problem of perception” (see Crane, 
2011), which leads to question the relation between appearance and a supposed 
mind-independent reality, giving rise to the crucial issue of scepticism, which in 
turn lays at the heart of the general “problem of knowledge”. 
2. The Clash of Two Images 
The reflection on the problem of perception, then, leads to question the relation 
between subjective experience and a supposed mind-independent reality. In 
front of this problem, a classic option, which can be traced back to the ancient 
atomism, consists on distinguishing between two different kinds of properties 
of the appearing objects of perception: qualitative properties such as colors, 
smells, sounds, etc. - conceived as merely subjective appearances, internal to the 
mind of the experiencing subject – and quantitative, physical-mathematical 
properties (spatial extension, mass, shape, location, number, etc.) – conceived 
as objective properties of mind-independent objects. This classic view, then, 
constitutes a kind of internalism about qualities (or qualia internalism), which 
conceives the sensible qualities of the objects of experience as subjective 
sensations, whose appearance within the subject’s mind is caused by events in 
the material-physical realm (conceived as a-qualitative). 
This is, precisely, the classical philosophical option that is taken back by 
many thinkers at the beginning of the Modern Era, and that is put, in particular, 
by Galileo at the heart of the modern scientific enterprise. For Galileo, exactly, 
the «book of nature» is written in «the language of mathematics», whose 
characters «are triangles, circles and other geometrical figures» (Galilei, 1960). 
At the same time, the qualitative properties of the objects of perception must be 
 
3 These are different sources of intrapersonal variation. For the detailed analysis of different kinds of 
perceptual relativity in the specific case of color vision (intrapersonal, interpersonal and interspecies) 
see (Varela & Thompson, 1990; Thompson, Palacios, & Varela, 1992; Cohen, 2004, 2007, 2010, 
2012). 
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conceived as merely subjective appearances, internal to the perceiver’s mind. 
Galileo claims that: 
To excite in us tastes, odors, and sounds I believe that nothing is required in 
external bodies except shapes, numbers, and slow or rapid movements. I think 
that if ears, tongues, and noses were removed, shapes and numbers and motions 
would remain, but not odors or tastes or sounds. The latter, I believe, are nothing 
more than names when separated from living beings […] many sensations which 
are supposed to be qualities residing in external objects have no real existence 
save in us, and outside ourselves are mere names. (Galilei, 1960) 
Indeed, the thesis that mathematics constitutes the “language” in which “the 
book of nature” is written can be also interpreted in merely instrumentalistic 
terms, as just pointing to a useful method for investigating and “saving the 
phenomena”. As Husserl (1976) claims, however, in the modern tradition the 
realistic-metaphysical interpretation of the object of mathematical physics, with 
the expulsion of the sensible qualities from the ontology of nature, is prevalent4. 
Indeed, it is the view endorsed and developed by authors such as, among others, 
Descartes, Gassendi, Hobbes, Boyle and Locke. 
In his Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, Wilfrid Sellars (1962) 
calls this view the “scientific image of the world”, arguing that the clash between 
it and the “manifest image”, which is grounded on our ordinary experience, 
constitutes the most difficult and pressing problem for the contemporary 
philosophy. In particular, referring to Sellar’s terminology, I stress the fact that 
it refers, in fact, to a certain scientific image, which is based on a specific 
conception of knowledge and a consequent ontology of nature (merely physical-
mathematical and a-qualitative), conceived as a description of nature in itself. 
This interpretation of the “scientific image”, then, constitutes a metaphysical 
version of scientific realism56. 
The consequence of the foundation of the scientific image so conceived, 
then, is the neat separation between subjective experience (qualitative) and 
objective reality (devoid of sensible qualities). However, the mathematization of 
 
4 An interpretation that, for Husserl, aiming at grasping «the true being of nature itself», takes «for true 
being what is actually a method» (Husserl, 1976, p. 44, 51). 
5  On the distinction between empirical and metaphysical versions of scientific realism see (Parrini, 
1998, p. 115 ss.; 2002, chap. 3). 
6  Indeed, as the reader can see throughout this Issue, different conceptions of the scope and the 
cognitive significance of the natural sciences are possible, together with different ontological 
conceptions of nature and matter (which lead, therefore, to different “scientific images”, which go 
beyond the Galilean abstraction).  
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nature, with the concomitant expulsion of the sensible qualities from its 
ontology, which constitutes the founding act of modern science and philosophy 
in much of their development, is deeply problematic. The psychologization of 
the qualities, which traces them back to the merely mental sphere and removes 
them from the domain of external reality, has serious consequences on our 
conception of the world, and of the place of man in it, having deep implications 
on the meaning and value of our life and experience. As Husserl claims, exactly, 
Galileo's doctrine «of the merely subjective character of the specific sense-
qualities, which soon afterward was consistently formulated by Hobbes as the 
doctrine of the subjectivity of all concrete phenomena of sensibly intuitive 
nature and world in general» implies that «[t]he phenomena are only in the 
subjects; they are there only as causal results of events taking place in true 
nature, which events exist only with mathematical properties» (Husserl, 1976, 
p. 53-54). But, for Husserl, the consequences of this theoretical move are huge, 
since they concern nothing less than the meaning and value of our life: 
If the intuited world of our life is merely subjective, then all the truths of pre- and 
extrascientific life which have to do with its factual being are deprived of value. 
They have meaning only insofar as they, while themselves false, vaguely indicate 
an in-itself which lies behind this world of possible experience and is 
transcendent in respect to it. (Husserl, 1976, p. 53-54) 
3. The Place of Qualities in the Mind 
The problem of the epistemological and ontological status of the qualities is also 
at the heart of the contemporary debate in the philosophy of mind, in relation to 
the crucial issues of naturalism and reductionism. The so-called “hard problem” 
of phenomenal consciousness (Chalmers, 1995), in particular, arises when we 
preliminary assume a certain (physicalistic) conception of Nature, to later ask 
about the “location” of the mind in it7. 
Indeed, all the debate on naturalism and the naturalization of the mind is 
based on the standard presupposition of the physicalistic conception of Nature. 
This is because, once one has defined Nature as an objective, mind-independent 
domain that is devoid of all the qualitative properties that essentially depend on 
the relation with first-person experience, the relation that exists between this 
 
7 This is, precisely, the issue enclosed in the title of Broad’s The Mind and its Place in Nature (Broad, 
1925), restated by Chalmers as the issue of the place of phenomenal consciousness in Nature 
(Chalmers, 2003). 
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domain and the subjective experience becomes problematic. In particular, as is 
well known, the hard problem for naturalism – conceived as a monistic 
metaphysical view which admits only physical matter as the ontological “stuff” 
of all reality – consists in the difficulty of reducing to the domain of physics those 
qualitative properties that have been preliminary expelled from the ontological 
furniture of the world (the so-called “qualia”).  
The connection between physicalism and the problem of phenomenal 
consciousness is clearly stated, for example, by Chalmers: «On the most 
common conception of nature, the natural world is the physical world», and, at 
the same time, «consciousness fits uneasily into our conception of the natural 
world» (Chalmers, 2003, p. 102). More recently, Kriegel has defined the 
naturalistic location strategy in the philosophy of mind thus: 
[It] is a matter of identifying [a puzzling phenomenon] with some phenomenon 
also describable in such a way that […] [it], as thus alternatively described, 
counts as “non-mysterious” and “kosher” within a metaphysical perspective that 
gives pride of place to natural science […]. Naturalistic location thus involves 
taking the vocabulary of the natural sciences to be the privileged vocabulary in 
serious metaphysics. (Kriegel, 2013, p. 4) 
It is by presupposing this prevalent paradigm that, therefore, different options 
for the naturalization of subjectivity are evaluated in the philosophy of mind: 
eliminativism, reductivism, non-reductive naturalism (such as Chalmers’ 
“naturalistic dualism of properties”, and various forms of strong-ontological 
emergentism8). Here I just want to stress the fact that all these options are based 
on the presupposition of a certain, a-qualitative, conception of material nature 
(in order to investigate, in case, the ontological status of the qualities of 
experience, conceived as internal properties of the mind). 
Therefore, the physicalistic conception of matter, and the consequent 
ontology of nature, is based on a specific conception of knowledge. Specifically, 
scientific realism and naturalism presuppose, as we have seen, the idea that the 
qualities of the appearing objects of perceptual experience are merely 
subjective. Therefore, as I said, they presuppose an internalism about qualities 
(or qualia internalism). In this case, then, a certain ontological view (defined as 
the theory of reality or Being) depends on a certain epistemology (theory of 
 
8 On strong or ontological emergentism see, for example, (Broad, 1925; Chalmers, 2006; O’Connor 
& Wong, 2006; Stephan, 2004). 
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knowledge). But this relation between epistemology and ontology can be 
generalized in order to argue, as I shall do in the following, that to know “what 
there is” (ontology) we have to question, first, the conditions of possibility of 
our knowledge of what there is. That is: epistemology comes first9. 
4. Externalism About Qualities and Naïve Naturalism 
The problematization of the epistemological presuppositions of the 
physicalistic ontology of nature leads to investigate different possible 
alternatives. Indeed, all the authors of the essays collected in this Issue explore 
different options for accounting for the qualities, in contrast to those scientific 
and philosophical abstractions that expelled them from the ontology of nature. 
In particular, another classic option is constituted by different forms of naïve 
realism, which are based on a kind of externalism about qualities (or qualia 
externalism10). This conception, exactly, constitutes another classic option in 
philosophy for accounting for the “problem of perception”. According to it, 
notwithstanding the phenomena of perceptual relativity, illusion and 
hallucination, veridical perception puts us directly in contact with external, 
mind-independent objects, which are endowed with both qualitative and 
quantitative properties. This view, then, constitutes a kind of direct or naïve 
realism, which can be put at the basis of a conception of the natural world that is 
more faithful to the common-sense, “manifest” image. It can be put, then, at the 
basis of a kind of naïve naturalism.  
Of course, however, when naïve realism is elaborated in relation to the 
problem of knowledge, it has to be developed as a sophisticated theory that is 
able to account for phenomena such as relativity, illusion and hallucination. In 
particular, in the philosophy of mind and perception an articulated proposal of 
this kind can be found in Gibson’s ecological theory of direct perception 
(Gibson, 1967, 1972), which is explicitly elaborated as a defence of naïve 
realism (i.e. the «naïve belief in the world of objects and events» and the «simple-
minded conviction that our senses give knowledge of it» (Gibson, 1967, p. 
 
9 Obviously, I take this conception of the relation between epistemology and ontology or metaphysics 
from Kant’s transcendental idealism, with the thesis that the critique of knowledge comes before any 
ontological inquiry. I shall develop this point below. 
10 The latter expression is used by Dretske, who argues for a kind of externalist representationalism 
(Dretske, 1995, 1996, 2003). Here I cannot develop a detailed analysis of Dretske’s view, which, in 
my opinion, turns out to be a either a kind of eliminativism about qualia, or another kind of qualia 
internalism. For some criticisms to Dretske’s view see (Mcintyre, 1999; Williford, 2013). 
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168). In the contemporary debate, Gibson’s theory of direct perception is 
reprised and developed by many authors. For example, the proponents of the so-
called “sensorimotor account” (Noë & O’Regan, 2002; O’Regan & Noë, 2001) 
develop a specific version of the enactivist view that, differently from the original 
proposal of Varela, Thompson and Rosch (Varela & Thompson, 1990; Varela, 
Thompson, & Rosch, 1991; Thompson, Palacios, & Varela, 1992) - as we will 
see soon - conceives of perception as a direct relation with an external 
environment that is endowed with certain pre-given, qualitative properties. 
Other authors that argue for a kind of direct-naïve realism are, for example, 
Searle (2012, 2015) – whose last book is significatively entitled Seeing Things 
As They Are – and some proponents of a realistic and naturalized interpretation 
of Husserlian phenomenology (Petitot & Smith, 1997; Petitot, 1995, 1999; 
Smith, 1995, 1999). 
In particular, Jean Petitot and Barry Smith  have proposed a specific 
interpretation and development of phenomenology, which aims at being a 
peculiar strategy for the naturalization of the mind. Specifically, their 
naturalized version of phenomenology aims at naturalizing consciousness 
through an «enlargement of the concept of nature» and a «phenomenalization of 
physical objectivity» (Roy, Petitot, Pachoud, & Varela, 1999, p. 68-69). These 
authors, in particular, argue for a realistic interpretation of Husserlian 
phenomenology – which draws on Gibson’s theory of direct perception – with a 
view to accounting for the macroscopic structuration of nature, which is 
qualitative and morphological: 
Our thesis is that phenomenal manifestation is also a mode of manifestation of 
matter and that there can indeed exist a sort of phenomenal physics. This 
phenomenal physics is of course different from standard fundamental physics: it 
is qualitative, macroscopic and emergent. Yet it is, nonetheless, objective. 
(Petitot & Smith, 1997, p. 241) 11 
 
11 I have to specify that Petitot is cautious regarding the issue of realism, admitting also a ‘Kantian 
reading’ of the notion of objective reality that is involved by the phenomenal physics (Petitot & Smith, 
1997, p. 239, 248). Smith (1995, 1999), on the contrary, explicitly endorses a metaphysically realist 
interpretation of the phenophysics, claiming that it corresponds to the commonsensical view of the 
world conceived «as embracing a plurality of enduring substances possessing sensible qualities and 
undergoing changes (events and processes) of various sorts, all existing independently of our 
knowledge and awareness and all such as to constitute a single whole that is extended in space and time» 
(Smith, 1995, p. 305). 
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In this way, these authors propose a «new sort of emergentist position» 
(Petitot & Smith, 1997, p. 233), which aims at accounting for the qualitative 
dimension of the objects of perceptual experience and, therefore, of nature. 
They call this view phenophysics or qualitative ontology: an ontological 
conception of the natural world that is similar to pre-Galilean accounts of the 
common-sense world12. Furthermore, these authors consider their approach as 
a fruitful basis not only for the investigation of nature but, also, of the place of 
subjectivity in it. They conceive it, then, as a strategy for the naturalization of 
consciousness and, therefore, of phenomenology (both in the wide sense that is 
common in the philosophy of mind, and in the narrow sense that refers to the 
philosophical enterprise inaugurated by Husserl). In the view proposed by these 
authors, then, the qualities must be conceived as pertaining to both nature and 
the mind13. 
In synthesis, then, direct-naïve theories conceive of perception as a direct 
relation – not mediated by any internal content and by any subjective, 
constitutive function – between the mind and a qualitative world, which is 
endowed with all the properties that appear to us in perception. The difficulties 
of this view, however, consist precisely in the “problem of perception” 
(relativity, illusion, hallucination). The fact that the perceptual dynamic implies 
a continuous flow of appearances (subjective sensations), which are relative to 
various subjective and environmental conditions, and which can be present also 
in un-veridical cases (illusion, hallucination) leads to formulate a distinction 
between the supposed properties of mind-independent objects and the 
subjective appearances. The central thesis of direct theories of perception such 
as Gibson’s, on the contrary, is that subjective qualities do not play an essential, 
constitutive role in the perception of mind-independent objects14.  
 
12  See Petitot & Smith (1997), Petitot (1999) for the details of their analyses, based on the 
mathematical ideas of René Thom and on Husserl’s phenomenological mereology. Furthermore, Smith 
develops the project of a qualitative ontology by crucially referring to the tradition of Gestalt psychology 
and, in particular, to the Berlin school (of Wertheimer, Koffka and Köhler), which conceived the 
Gestalten as objective structures of the external reality, in contrast to the “production theory” of the 
Graz school (see Smith, 1988). I shall briefly return to this point below. 
13 Also Searle, within his defence of a kind of direct realism and, therefore, of a kind of naïve naturalism, 
develops a naturalistic conception of the mind, by developing a peculiar kind of emergentism (see 
Searle, 2012). 
14 In case, according to these theories, combined also with the so-called “disjunctive thesis”, internal 
appearances play a constitutive role only in the un-veridical cases. 
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However, here an objection to the descriptive adequacy of the model of 
direct perception can be formulated by referring to the tradition of 
transcendental philosophy. Direct-naïve theories, in fact, hardly account for the 
role of subjective functions in perception. The transcendental line of argument, 
on the contrary, stresses the essential role that subjective appearances play in 
the constitution of the objectual correlates of perception, in both veridical and 
un-veridical cases. Specifically, according to Kantian transcendental philosophy 
(also in its development in Husserlian transcendental phenomenology), 
transcendental functions of subjectivity constitute «conditions of the possibility 
of experience» that are «at the same time, conditions of the possibility of the 
objects of experience» (Kant, 1998, A158/B197)15. 
In this way, the transcendental problematization of the theories of direct 
perception (and of their consequent form of naïve realism and naturalism), leads 
to highlight the fact that, similarly to the metaphysical version of scientific 
realism - which leads to physical-mathematical naturalism - these theories lead 
to another kind of metaphysical realism – in the form of naïve naturalism – that 
is highly problematic. This is because, like any kind of metaphysical realism that 
aims at being an account of reality in itself, this view clashes with sceptical 
objections, which question the possibility of transcending those conditions of 
knowability of reality that depend on the constitution of (human) subjectivity, in 
order to grasp a supposed reality “in itself”. And this is because, as Preti claims, 
scepticism and metaphysical realism can be conceived as «two sides of the same 
coin» (Preti, 1974, my translation)16.  
 
15 It is worth noticing that an intentional model of the relation subject-object in perception, which 
recognizes the essential role of subjective functions, is present in the Graz school of Gestalt psychology, 
which, in contrast to the Berlin school, developed a “production theory” (see Smith, 1988) which has 
much in common with the Husserlian phenomenology of the constitution. 
16 In the words of Parrini: «[t]here cannot be an overcoming of the skeptical instance as long as we get 
stuck in a framing of the problem of knowledge that is based on the ‘dogmatic’ assumption of a knowing 
subject opposed to the ‘existence in itself of a real world that is independent from the act of knowledge’ 
(Preti, 1974). It is this ontologically doomed framing of the problem of knowledge that legitimates the 
skeptical instance […]. This is especially clear when we consider the scholastic formula veritas est 
adaequatio rei et intellectus as criterion of truth: ‘thought, to be precise, doesn’t contain any criterion 
to establish the adaequatio, exactly because it has its own criterion outside of itself, in the res’. Reality 
has to be caught, grasped, but we can never know ‘if we caught a real thing or a shadow’ (Preti, 1974). 
For this reason, metaphysical realism and skeptical instance have to be conceived as ‘two sides of the 
same coin’ (Preti, 1974)». (Parrini, 2002, p. 72, my translation). 
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5. The Enactive Approach to Qualitative Ontology 
The transcendental problematization of direct-naïve realism (and naturalism), 
with its externalism about qualities (that conceives of them as objective 
properties of nature “in itself”) leads to consider, therefore, other alternatives. 
In particular, the enactive approach constitutes such an alternative account, 
thanks to its conception of the relation between subject and object as a 
dependent co-origination in the process of experience. Specifically, the original 
formulation of this view is developed, by Varela and Thompson, in relation to a 
specific qualitative field: the domain of color vision and color ontology 
(considered as a “case study for cognitive science”; Varela & Thompson, 1990; 
Thompson et al., 1992). Precisely, in the analyses of color perception that 
preceded The Embodied Mind (Varela et al., 1991), these authors propose a 
specific conception of the relation of subject and object in perception that avoids 
the pitfalls of both subjectivism and objectivism about color. These notions, 
precisely, correspond, in the the domain of color vision, to the alternatives that 
I have previously called internalism and externalism about sensible qualities17. 
In the enactive view of color (which can be generalized to all the sensible 
qualities of the objects of perception), then, colors are properties that result 
from the co-determination of a living organism and its environment. In this view, 
in particular, the environment that is perceived by a living organism must not be 
conceived as a domain that pre-exists the cognitive relation. Notwithstanding 
some ambiguities in their proposal, in fact, the original formulation of the 
enactive approach is radically relationist, since it conceives the entire perceptual 
environment that is enacted by an organism as relational, in all of its aspects 
(qualitative and quantitative), and not as distinct and caused by a supposed pre-
given world (i.e. a metaphysical reality “in itself”).  
By analysing the case of color vision, then, the enactivists – in this original 
formulation of the view, which I qualify as transcendental – propose a view of the 
relation perceiver-environment as reciprocal enactment or dependent co-
origination. In particular, these authors carefully distinguish the enactive view 
of color, which they call also «ecological experientialism», from both «the 
“internalist” view that perceptual content is provided by subjective qualities 
(qualia)» (Thompson et al., 1992, p. 402) – i.e. the internalism about qualities 
– and from a kind of direct-naïve realism such as Gibson’s – and, I add, also from 
 
17 On the different forms of color subjectivism (dispositionalism, relationalism) and color objectivism 
(color physicalism, primitivism) see (Cohen, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2012; Maund, 2012). 
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its development in the so-called “sensorimotor account” of Noë and O’Regan 
(Noë & O’Regan, 2002; O’Regan & Noë, 2001). In particular, concerning the 
latter view, Varela and Thompson criticize «Gibson’s belief that the only 
alternative to the mistaken sense-data view of perception is direct realism […]» 
(Thompson et al., 1992, p. 399). In contrast to the development of the 
ecological view of perception into a kind of direct-naïve realism, indeed, the 
(transcendental) enactivists claim that: 
Our approach [...] takes from Gibson the deep insight that perception must be 
understood within the ecological context of guided activity, but we develop this 
insight […] by treating the environment not simply as the ecological setting for 
animal activity, but also as something determined by that very activity. 
(Thompson et al., 1992, p. 399) 
In particular, in my opinion this passage must be interpreted in a strong 
sense: the environment that is perceived by a living organism is not a pre-given 
external domain, but arises together with the perceiver in the perceptual 
relation. Indeed, in the enactive view perceiver and environment are not pre-
given, substantial domains that somehow enter in relation in perception, but 
they are processes that dependently co-arise. The central thesis of the enactive 
approach, exactly, is that «knower and known, mind and world, stand in relation 
to each other through mutual specification or dependent coorigination» (Varela 
et al., 1991, p. 150). 
The crucial concept, then, is that of dependent co-arising, which translates 
the notion of pratityasamutpada: a central concept of Buddhist thought and 
especially of the Madhyamaka philosophy. The reference to this tradition is not 
marginal in The Embodied Mind, constituting the framework within which the 
enactivists develop their entire proposal. In particular, the enactive view is 
elaborated as a general philosophical framework for rethinking the relation 
between subject and object, by deconstructing the concept of them as 
substantial, pre-given and independent realities, and substituting the concept of 
a neat duality of subject-object with the strong relationist and processual view 
that is expressed by the notion of dependent co-arising. Indeed, the enactivists 
take back from Nagarjuna, the founder of the Madhyamaka, a deconstructive 
dialectic whose aim consists on showing the emptiness of substantial reality 
(sunyata) of both subject and object, mind and world18. 
 
18 On the Madhyamaka (and enactivism) see also (Bitbol, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2012). 
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Here I will not enter into the details of the enactive proposal in relation with 
the Madhyamaka relationism, and I shall highlight only some crucial aspects of 
this view. In particular, I stress the fact that the arguments that lead to the 
deconstruction of the duality of subject-object conceived as substantial poles of 
the cognitive relation are based on an analysis of the structure of experience, and 
that they assume a transcendental import19. These arguments, exactly, lead to 
claim the fundamental correlation between subject and object, which are not 
substantial, pre-given domains, and which dependently co-emerge in the 
process of experience.  
In particular, in my view, the original (transcendental) version of the enactive 
approach can be fruitfully combined also with Husserlian genetic and 
transcendental phenomenology, which leads too to a conception of the relation 
between subject and object as genetic co-constitution. In particular, by 
investigating the temporal genesis of experience and the “genesis of the 
constitution” (Husserl, 2001), Husserl’s view leads to conceive the genesis of 
both subject and object as a co-constitution in reciprocal dependence, in the 
same temporal process that is, exactly, a dependent co-origination20. 
6. Lines of Development of the Enactive Ontology 
The enactive approach, therefore, offers a specific, relationist and processual 
account of the relation between subjective experience and experienced reality, 
avoiding the pitfalls of both subjectivism and objectivism. In particular, in 
contrast to both internalism and externalism about qualities, the transcendental 
version of enactivism (combined with genetic phenomenology) leads to a strong 
relationism about qualities, and about all the properties of experience and reality 
in general. And, in this way, this view constitutes a fruitful and promising 
approach for developing the ontological inquiry. In my view, in particular, this 
approach can be applied to the analysis of different ontological domains (or 
“regional ontologies”, in Husserl’s terminology). Indeed, the enactive 
framework is explored and developed by different essays collected in this Issue, 
in relation to the rethinking of the categories through which we account for the 
qualitative dimension of experience and reality. 
 
19 On Nagarjuna’s arguments see especially (Varela et al., 1991, p. 221 ss.; Bitbol, 2003, p. 339). 
20 I argued for this interpretation of genetic phenomenology in my PhD dissertation (Experience and 
Becoming. A Path Through Enactivism and Genetic Phenomenology, discussed the 7.03.2016 at the 
University of Florence), and I am further developing it in a forthcoming work. 
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The enactive approach, in particular, leads especially to rethink the notions 
of nature and matter, in view of developing a qualitative ontology of nature. In 
this context, a central role is assumed by the reflection on the biological domain, 
with the possibility to investigate concepts such as organism, life and evolution 
in ways that crucially involve the qualitative dimension, conceived in the terms 
of the reciprocal enactment of organism and environment. This line of 
investigation, in my view, also opens the possibility of rethinking the biological 
accounts of the emergence and the evolution of the living, by investigating the 
crucial role of the sentience in natural selection. 
7. An Open Issue: Ontology or Metaphysics? 
In conclusion, I want to point out to an open issue that arises when we expand 
on the ontological implications of the enactive view. I already claimed that the 
development of this conception in the direction of a kind of direct-naïve realism 
and naturalism, especially in the sensorimotor account, enters in conflict with 
some fundamental tenets of the original enactive proposal. In particular, it goes 
against the thesis that organism and environment are not two substantial, pre-
given domains that pre-exist the enactive relation. As a consequence, for the 
enactive view the environment is not directly perceived but enacted in a strong 
sense. Now, I want to consider another possible ontological interpretation of 
this view, which goes in the direction of another kind of naturalistic monism 
(alternative to both scientific and naïve naturalism). 
In particular, the qualitative ontology of nature that emerges from the enactive 
approach can be developed by drawing also on different views that point too toward 
an overcoming of the neat duality of subject and object, by substituting it with the 
admission of an ontological level that precedes and grounds both. I refer, in 
particular, to the process philosophies (in authors such as Whitehead, Bergson, 
Merleau-Ponty) and to the tradition of neutral monism (in Mach, James, Russell; see 
Stubenberg, 2014). The combination between these views can lead to a kind of 
neutral-process monism that is very near to the enactive view, since it admits a 
domain of reality that is neither subjective nor objective, and from which they both 
co-emerge in a process of dependent co-origination.  
However, this neutral-processual monism can be developed in two different 
ways: a metaphysical version, and an ontological version. To develop this point, 
in particular, I shall use a specific way of distinguishing between ontology 
(conceived as a theory of the constitution of reality) and metaphysics (conceived 
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as the theory of the ultimate or absolute Being). I define, then, the metaphysics 
as the theory that aims at grasping the ultimate dimension of reality “in itself”. 
The metaphysical version of the neutral-process monism, then, would constitute 
a neutral-process metaphysics that aims at being a theory of the ultimate-
absolute reality. 
However, I have already claimed that a metaphysical realism of this kind is 
always at risk of reversing into scepticism, being for this reason as problematic 
as both scientific and naïve realism and naturalism. The other option – which I 
favour – on the contrary, consists on stressing the transcendental delimitation 
of our possibilities of knowledge to the relational domain of the empirical (and 
not metaphysical) reality. This is, exactly, an anti-foundationalist standpoint that 
is much present in The Embodied Mind, where it is motivated through the 
reference to the concept of emptiness as groundlessness in the Madhyamaka21. 
So conceived, then, the enactive ontology becomes a theory of the 
constitution of reality, which can admit a monistic metaphysical dimension from 
which both subject and object co-emerge, without laying any knowledge claim 
about it. I suggest, then, that the enactive ontology can (and must, in my 
opinion) be distinguished from a metaphysical view of the absolute-ultimate 
reality. In particular, concerning this ultimate Being that somehow “precedes” 
the co-emergence of subject and object in the process of experience, the view 
here outlined can remain agnostic, claiming that we are confined to the 
ontological (not metaphysical) domain of experience and its objects.  
Indeed, the reflection on the structure of experience, in its passive 
dimension, testifies that it depends on the being of a reality that transcends the 
subjective sphere and that, therefore, does not depend for its existence on our 
subjective activity (in contrast to a kind of subjective-metaphysical idealism). 
However, the agnostic position claims that, concerning this ultimate reality, we 
cannot say much, being limited to the knowledge of the empirical-ontological 
domain in which subject and object dependently co-emerge 22 . Within this 
 
21 Bitbol (2003) stresses too the anti-metaphysical aspect of the Madhyamaka teachings, claiming that, 
combined with Kantian philosophy and also with a specific interpretation of quantum mechanics, they 
constitute a strong relationist view that is a “cure for metaphysical illusions” (Bitbol, 2003). 
22 A similar view can be found in Zhok (2015), who argues for a «phenomenologically based quasi-
Spinozian vision» that assumes «the subsistence of a transcendent sphere»  (Zhok, 2015, p. 75, 54). 
Developing this view in relation, in particular, to the issues of causation and mental causation, Zhok 
claims that «we have reasons to concede the transcendent subsistence of a unitary ontological 
background where all efficacious relations take place», but that «we have no reasons, apart from 
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delimitation of our inquiry to the domain of experience, in its dual structure of 
subject-object, it is possible, then, to exploit the potential developments of the 
enactive ontology, avoiding the pitfalls of a metaphysical-absolute view that 
would be always vulnerable to skeptical objections. 
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